The Analysis of Equity Incentive Plans’ Design for Essential Factors of China’s Listed Companies by 闫勋龙
  
学校编码：10384                                  分类号      密级        




硕  士  学  位  论  文 
                                           
我国上市公司股权激励计划要素设计分析 
The Analysis of Equity Incentive Plans’ Design for Essential 




指导教师姓名： 赵向琴 副教授 
专  业 名 称：  金   融   学 
论文提交日期：  2008 年 3 月 
论文答辩时间：  2008 年 5 月 
学位授予日期：    
 
  
答辩委员会主席：           
评    阅    人：           























                        声明人（签名）： 











































  1、保密（ ），在   年解密后适用本授权书。 




作者签名：      日期：  年 月 日 




















摘   要 
股权激励作为一种长期激励工具，在降低委托—代理成本、激励管理层努力
工作和提高企业绩效等方面发挥着重要作用，这已经在美国等西方发达国家的实







































As a long-term incentive mechanism, equity incentive is effective to cut down 
the cost of entrust-deputy, raise the efficiency of enterprises, and incentive employee, 
which have been proved in America and other western developed countries. China 
Securities Regulatory Commission enacted “The Measures Governing Equity 
Incentive Plans of Listed Companies” (For Trial Implementation) and brought into 
effect on Jan 4th, 2006, the equity incentive mechanism of China’s listed companies 
come into a regularly operating stage. But whether equity incentive plans of china’s 
listed companies can achieve the anticipated sound effects depends on the 
appropriateness of equity incentive plans’ essential factors.  
From the enactment of “The Measures Governing Equity Incentive Plans of 
Listed Companies” (For Trial Implementation) to Jan 18th, 2008, amount to 61 listed 
companies exposed the equity incentive plans draft which was designed according to 
the law. After retrospection of the relevant theory about equity incentive plans and the 
development of equity incentive plans in china, the thesis makes data description of 
61 programs, and analyzes eight essential factors of equity incentive plans, which 
include incentive object, the source of funds, the source of stock, the price of 
exercising, the scale of provision, the period of validity, exercising proviso, 
performance evaluation indicators. It is found that there exist some default and 
limitation in the design of China’s equity incentive plans which manifest mainly: the 
performance evaluation indicators system is not perfect and lay particular stress on 
profit indicators; the choice of time enactment of exercising price is not appropriate 
and exercising price is a little low; the period of validity and restriction is not enough 
for long-time restriction to executives. Meanwhile, through analysis of the design for 
essential factors of VanKe A and YiLi Shares, by comparison it is found that the 
design of performance evaluation indicators plays an important role in the whole 















on the management of the firm.  
This thesis provides improvement methods for the existing principal problems. In 
addition, it also suggests supplement methods to the design for other essential factors. 
At last, this thesis comes up with some useful advice for the improvement of 
environment of listed companies’ equity incentive plans. 
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导  论 
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上市公司施行股权激励的法律障碍得以消除。2006 年 1 月 4 日中国证监会发布
了《中国上市公司股权激励管理办法》（试行），该法案的颁发首次扫清了国内上
市公司推行股权激励在政策上的核心障碍。从该办法颁布至 2008 年 1 月 18 日，
















































































Jensen 和 Murphy (1990) [7]认为适量的以经营业绩考核为基础的股权激励机

















和 Vishny(1988) [12]研究了董事会成员的持股比例与 Tobin’s Q 值之间的分段线性
关系后发现，在 0—5％的区间内，Tobin’s Q 值与董事会成员的持股比例呈正相
关关系；在 5％－25％的区间内，两者呈负相关关系；当超过 25％以后，Tobin’s 
Q 值随董事会成员持股比例的增加而缓慢增加。Griffith(1999) [13]的研究同样也发
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